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Theory or Attitude? A Comparative
Analysis of Turkish Newspaper Articles
on Turkish Foreign Policy,
June 2008–June 2011
METIN GURCAN
Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Bilkent/Ankara 06800, Turkey
ABSTRACT Turkish Foreign Policy (FP) has seen a paradigmatic transformation. This study
presents a comparative analysis of 1535 articles, written by more than a hundred columnists
and published in ten Turkish newspapers between June 2008 and June 2011. Results show a
strong polarization of opinion such that articles with realist theoretical stance are highly likely
to be critical of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) FP for Turkey, whereas articles
with liberal and constructivist theoretical stance are highly likely to have pro-government posi-
tioning. In this close association, the question is whether attitude to government policy pre-
cedes or follows theoretical stance. Results suggest that newspapers employ mostly
whatever theory will support their stance for or against the AKP’s new-era FP. In addition,
results suggest little attention to Turkey’s bid for European Union membership and little atten-
tion to world problems outside the Middle East.




Turkish Foreign Policy (FP) has been in a period of transformation in recent years, as
Turkey has experienced important changes in both internal and external political
relations. In parallel with the increase of the visibility of Turkish FP both in the inter-
national and domestic domain, there has emerged a great curiosity to understand the
dynamics of these changes. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Turkey, who has made a great contribution to the paradigmatic shift, asserts that
“over the past seven years, Turkey has been able to formulate a systematic and
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cohesive methodological approach to world affairs because its political party (Justice
and Development Party (AKP), Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) has been able to govern,
resulting in real political stability at home.”1 Davutoğlu suggests three methodologi-
cal and five operational principles that drive Turkey’s FP today.
The methodological principles include “visionary approach to the issues instead of
the crisis-oriented attitude that dominated FP during the entire Cold War period,”
“basing Turkish FP on a consistent and systematic framework around the world,”
and “the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in
the spread of Turkish soft power in the region.”2 The operational principles are: a
“balance between security and democracy, zero problems toward neighbors, proac-
tive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, multi-dimensional FP which sets Turkey’s
relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition,”
and finally “rhythmic diplomacy which aspires to provide Turkey with a more
active role in international relations.”3
It is not a hyperbole to state that this ambitious vision of a new Turkish FP intends
to transform both Turkey and the region not merely politically, but also in economic
and cultural ways. The self-reliance of the AKP, its independent tailoring of FP par-
ameters, and the increasing visibility of Turkish FP in the global arena are significant
indicators of the transformation of FP in the new era. The question is then, in Zaman
columnist Ekrem Dumanlı’s words, “while the vision of Turkey has been broadening,
is the media ready for this wider vision?”4 The findings of this study suggest that the
answer may be that the media are not ready.
Methodology and Research Question
In this study, a qualitative content analysis is applied to examine the corpus of
Turkish mass media coverage of Turkish FP. Content analysis is a research
method for making replicable and convincing inferences from a corpus of texts
with the aim of providing knowledge and new insights.5 To perform a content analy-
sis on a given text, the text is coded or broken down into convenient categories on a
variety of levels, word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or theme, and then scrutinized,
using conceptual or relational analysis.6
Qualitative content analysis, a type of content analysis, is designed for “subjective
interpretation” of the content of a text through the systematic classification process of
coding and identifying themes or patterns.7 Qualitative content analysis goes beyond
merely counting words or digging out “objective” content from texts to study mean-
ings, themes and patterns that may be latent or buried in a particular text. It enables
researchers to realize social reality in a subjective but scientific manner.
In this study, a manual qualitative analysis is conducted to capture overall argu-
ment, supportive explanations, theoretical stance and pro/anti-government position-
ing of each article. Titles, arguments and supportive explanations that establish the
meaning in the context are examined to produce both a thematic structure for each
article and to obtain the latent context, where the meaning is materialized. Although
manual analysis would be insufficient to extrapolate specific details, the abundance






























and decisiveness of themes highlighting the theoretical stances and attitudes of news-
paper columnists on the performance of Turkish FP make it possible to grasp the
latent context of the samples.
One should note that all words or phrases used in this study are direct quotations
from the articles. The name of the columnists, the name of the newspapers and the
exact publication date (mm.dd.yy) of the articles from which the direct quotations
are taken, and attached to the quotations to provide greater reliability of citations.
Step 1: Collecting data
To obtain the corpus, a search was conducted in the database within the archive of the
author by entering the key word “dış politika (FP)” among columnists’ articles. With
this search, all articles that include the key word “dış politika” in content were fil-
tered. Then, selected articles were further screened to select articles for analysis. In
this further screening, the following criteria were applied to enhance the quality of
the sample.
(a) The articles in the sample should solely be on FP (articles addressing other topics
along with the FP have not been included)
(b) The articles in the sample should propose a sound argument and lay out sufficient
explanations to support this argument (therefore, articles that contain only com-
ments have been omitted)
Step 2: Classification of the corpus
After coding the themes in all articles, the corpus is first classified according to the
theoretical stance. In this step, the articles direct quotes of which some are presented
below, for instance, are classified in the realist camp.
. “Russian-Georgian War Still Is A Proof That Realist Doctrine Prevails Over
The International System.”8
. “Lisbon Summit Is A Triumph And Breakpoint Of Practical Politics In The
Clash Of Pragmatist/Idealist.”9
. “There Exist Turkey’s Expansions, Rising Economical Force, Ascending Inter-
national Profile, Even More Strategic Efforts To Be A Global Force But Not
Enough Capacity To Sustain His Dream.”10
. “Power Should Be Viewed In A Realistic Manner.”11
. “Is Turkey A Global Force? We Should Not Forget That The Means-Objective
Relationship Is The Basic Rule Of Strategy.”12
. “Turkey Should Abstain From Sanction To Iran. What If Iran Produces
Weapons In The Future?”13
































. “After The Gaza, Sudan And Iran Cases, Now Is The Time For Taliban
Mediation. What A Fallacy.”15
. “Ottoman Society Of Nation Seems Classy, But The Question Is Whether It Is
Realistic.”16
The following commonly used phrases defining the Turkish FP are, for instance,
good indicators in classifying the articles in which they appeared in the realist
camp: realpolitik, outcome-based FP, FP respectful to the geopolitical necessities,
concrete, non-populist, traditional, axis shift in FP, FP respectful to the national inter-
ests, pragmatist, Westernist, rationalist, effective, [when criticizing the FP] Jihadist
solidarity in the FP, Islamist, Middle East-centric, drifting, illusionist, confused,
romantic, treacherous, FP with neo-Ottoman fantasies.
In contrast, the articles presented below, for instance, are classified in the liberal
camp:
. “Future Belongs To Soft Power.”17
. “Regional Vision of Turkey at Mesopotamia Economic Basin.”18
. “Turkey That Shaking Off The Burdens In Its History And Ripening Its
Identity.”19
. “In the new era, Turkish foreign policy has the properties of zero challenge with
neighbors, carrying out a proactive reconciliation diplomacy, sustaining
relationship with the US and EU based on mutual respect, acting a part at inter-
national organizations actively, taking role in global conflicts.”20
. “On A Liberal Perspective, Turkey Has An Intention To Convert Its Economi-
cal Force Into Diplomatic Influence. But The Main Point Is That Do The Israel
Really A Necessary Cost?”21
. “If Tyrant Has Nation-State, Oppressed Ones Have Internationalism.”22
The following commonly used phrases helped to classify articles as liberal: moralpo-
litik, FP with global vision, econo-centric FP, multi-dimensional, FP with soft power,
FP with the mediator role, multilateral, idealist and principled, pacifist, humanist, FP
changing traditional perceptions, playmaker, proactive.
The articles the direct quotes of which some are presented below are, for instance,
classified into the constructivist camp:
. “Turning Back To Middle East Has Psychological Extents In Terms Of
Turkey’s Leadership.”23
. “Cultural And Emotional Territory” Has Gained Importance Much As “Phys-
ical Region.”24
. “We need to get rid of the indoctrinated apprehensions and geographical
determinism.”25
. “Davos outburst of Erdogan is not getting stubborn but standing staid. Pride is
the thing what the Arabian world needs.”26






























. “We should transform Israel by the hands of Turkey to solve regional
problems.”27
. “The traditional rigid, outcome-based definitions of FP have been out. It is not
the outcomes but processes and identities that shape the FP nowadays.”28
. “Turkey is a hybrid country with both Islamic and Western Identities.”29
. “When traditional pillars of international system are changing, arguments on
axis shift are merely illusions.”30
The following commonly used phrases are good indicators of the constructivist camp:
process-based FP, identity-driven, FP of honor, imperial Neo-Ottomanist vision,
transformative, FP delivering change and hope, fearless, Turkish FP as the guardian
of oppressed ones, trustworthy, courageous FP, FP restructuring the Wider Middle
East, FP transforming Israel.
After the classification in terms of the theoretical stance, the corpus, this time, is
classified according to the attitude of the columnists toward government’s perform-
ance on Turkish FP. Six sub-categories: strongly pessimist, pessimist, cautiously pes-
simist, cautiously optimist, optimist, strongly pessimist are set for this classification.
The tone of pro/anti government themes, the degree of praises/criticisms and the
nature of praises/criticism (explicit/implicit) are taken as the references for this classi-
fication. While, for instance, articles with explicit praises of the personalities of Prime
Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and articles that explicitly portray
a grand success story in FP are classified in the strongly optimistic camp; the articles
that depict the Turkish FP in the new period as a “success story” are classified in the
optimistic camp. The articles with an implicit success story and some reservations are
classified in the cautiously optimistic camp; and the articles with the tone of an
implicit failure but with some pro-government stipulations are classified in the
cautiously pessimistic camp. The articles that explicitly portray a failure and
openly criticize the government’s performance are classified in the pessimistic
camp while the articles with explicit criticisms toward decision makers and that
openly depict the shift in the new period as a “systemic break down of Turkish
FP” are classified in the strongly pessimistic camp.
Step 3: Analysis
Among the reviewed articles in each newspaper, the ones with explicit theoretical
stance are filtered, sorted and analyzed. Second, among the reviewed articles in
each newspaper, the articles with explicit pro/anti government stance are filtered,
sorted and analyzed. And then, the filtered articles are cross-tabulated in terms of
their theoretical stances and attitudes toward the performance of the government.
Below is the cross-tabulation of articles with explicit themes in terms of attitudes of
the columnists toward the Turkish FP’s performance and the columnists’ theoretical
stances:
Table 1 shows that a great majority of realist articles are pessimist on the Turkish































and constructivist articles are optimist in this period. What can be inferred from this
positioning? Since the columnists have inherently pro-government or anti-govern-
ment attitudes, do they prefer realist themes to attack government’s FP performance
or liberal and constructivist themes to defend it?
To answer these question;
(a) The section titled Theoretical Framework will first provide a brief review of what
realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches mean.
(b) Analysis section will highlight the findings of the study.
(c) Conclusion will lay out the quantitative and qualitative findings
Theoretical Framework
If one were to categorize the theoretical themes in the articles analyzed, one may
easily find out that these themes can be classified in terms of three widely accepted
theories of international relations: traditional realist and liberal theories and the con-
structivist approach.
Realism
Like the inhabitants of a wild jungle, in which anarchy and chaos prevails, states in
the international system must be self-interested, self-helping, ready for war and must
always watch the balance of power.31 In this jungle-like international system shaped
by anarchy, there is no definition of a good or bad state. That is why, for the states,
first survival and then maximizing relative power and hegemony is the ultimate goal.
Balance of power and diplomacy, the two most influential instruments in inter-
national relations, can correct the imperfections of world politics rooted in the inher-
ently existing malicious nature of man.
The principles of realism are;
. Politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature, and the history
and cumulative experience of mankind proves that human nature has not
changed. Nonetheless, if statesman act rationally and understand the law of
nature, policies would be better and the world would be a safer place.32
Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of Attitudes toward Turkish FP and Theoretical Stances
Theoretical stances
Attitudes toward Turkish FP Realist Liberal Constructivist
Pessimist 162 12 –
Optimist 21 80 66






























. Interests are defined in terms of power and thus motives and ideas matter little.33
. The political sphere is autonomous: economic, legal, moral and all other inter-
ests are subordinate to interests defined as power.34 Politics, therefore, is not a
function of ethics. There could be no effective morality where there was no
effective authority.
Liberalism
The primary assumption of the liberal school is that conflict is not caused by the
nature of man, but by the imperfections of the society of states. Reasoning, morality,
and rationality could improve the world, which is regarded as a “cultivatable land” by
this school.35 The dependent variable that this school seeks to understand is the
degree of institutionalization among states.
There are mainly three different strands of liberalism.
. Economic interdependence makes states less likely to fight.36 Stability flows not
from military power, but from the creation of a liberal economic order, which is
in fact for the wellbeing of everybody in the system. A liberal order fosters
economic interdependence, a situation in which states are mutually dependent
on each other.
. Democracies do not fight with each other.37 Like birds of a feather flocking
together, ideological solidarity among democracies prevents conflict.
. International institutions enhance cooperation and therefore reduce the likeli-
hood of conflict.38 They could help overcome selfish state behavior by encoura-
ging states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring peace.
Constructivism
The central idea of this approach is that much of the reality in world politics is socially
constructed and thus can change, that is, ideas, norms and identities are important.39
For constructivists, anarchy, for instance, the primary institution in realist thinking that
should be accepted as a pre-determined fact, “is what states make of it”.40 In contrast
to the realists, who define material power (military and economic) as the single most
important source of influence and authority in world politics, constructivists suggest
that power is more than brute force. To understand how power is distributed in world poli-
tics is not the key factor to understand international relations; rather the key is what states
understand about that power.41 Knowledge, culture, ideology may also be great sources
of power.42 The real power of social practices, for this approach, lies in the efficiency and
rapidity of their meaning-making capacity to first deconstruct conventional meanings and
then to reconstruct new meanings in a new socially constructed community.43
Analysis
When the articles are categorized and prioritized in terms of the issues they addressed































The corpus suggests that there exists a major polarization and cleavage on Turkish
FP in the print media that have a cardinal role in embodying the perceptions and
beliefs of Turkish public opinion. Among 1535, when 629 articles that include expli-
cit judgment on Turkish FP’s performance in the new era are classified according to
their evaluation on Turkish FP’s performance, the extent of existing polarization and
cleavage among opinions leaders in Turkish print media may be easily noticed
(Table 4, Figure 1).
One may then recognize the strength of Strongly Optimist (31.7 percent) and
Strongly Pessimist (35.1 percent) categories, and the weakness of the intermediate
ones. This is the clearest indicator of polarization. In the same vein, the fact that
while the articles in Hürriyet are substantially Strongly Pessimist ones, whereas
the articles in Zaman are largely in the category of Strongly Optimist, is another indi-
cation of this polarization and cleavage in terms of the stances of the newspapers. One
may wonder whether the Turkish FP in the new era is dreadful as Hürriyet says, or
marvelous as Zaman says. Is Turkish FP ascending or descending? Nuray Mert’s
words, “Overstate and understate spirals”44 sums up the dilemma of columnists
when positioning themselves relating to Turkish FP in the new era.
On the other hand, when 386 articles with an explicit theoretical emphasis are
reviewed (Figure 2 and Table 5).
To answer these questions, the subsequent section will, first, present a brief
summary of each newspaper’s attitude toward Turkish FP in the new era, and then
highlight the negative cases that contradict the general attitude of each newspaper.
Hürriyet
68 articles (30 percent) out of 231 explicitly include realist themes. Therefore, Hür-
riyet is the most realist newspaper examined in this study. It is also worth noting that
Figure 1. The Perception of the Columnists in Turkish Print Media on the Turkish FP’s
Performance.








































Milliyet, wide circulating newspaper
owned by Karacan Media Group and
has a publication policy close to a
secularist, liberal centralist stance
130,000 260 16.9
Radikal, newspaper owned by the
Dogan Media Group and has a
publication policy close to a leftist
and liberal stance
35,000 247 16.09
Hürriyet, the widest circulating
newspaper owned by the Dogan
Media Group and has a publication
policy close to a secularist centralist
and has a anti-government stance
415,000 231 15.04
Sabah, newspaper owned by Çalık
Group that has close ties with JDP
and has a pro-government stance
350,000 202 13.15
Zaman, newspaper owned by Islamic-
oriented Gülen movement and has a
pro-government stance
900,000 147 9.57
Star, the newspaper with a liberal
publication policy and ultra pro-
government stance
125,000 111 7.23
Yeni Şafak, the newspaper with a
Islamist and ultra pro-government
stance
110,000 106 6.90
Cumhuriyet which has a publication
policy close to a secularist statist-
leftist and has a anti-government
stance
50,000 103 6.7
Taraf, the newspaper which has a ultra-
liberal publication policy
55,000 78 5.08
Yeniçağ, the newspaper with a ultra-
nationalist publication policy and has
an anti-government stance
50,000 50 3.25
Total 2,286,611 1535 100%
aThe Circulation Report was taken from http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp (accessed
September 15, 2011). The total newspaper circulation of 35 different newspapers in Turkey
is roughly 3.5 million. The total number of 2,286,611 circulation of these 10 newspapers (as
of October 12, 2011) comprise therefore roughly 65 percent of the total newspaper




































1 US FP and the Turkey–US relations (2008 US
Presidential Elections, Global Crisis, Obama’s visits
to Turkey and Egypt, “Obamania” debate, US FP
priorities, Wikileaks documents)
240 15.63
2 Israel’s FP and the Turkey–Israel relations (Israel’s
Gaza attack, Mavi Marmara raid, the termination of
Anatolian Eagle Exercise, the broadcast of serial
“Separation” by TRT, Davos outburst, Israel–Hamas
and the Israeli–Iranian and the Israeli–US relations,
the Israeli lobby in the USA)
175 11.40
3 Turkey–Middle East relations, Arab Reforms, Libya 135 8.79
4 Praises or critiques on the performance of foreign
minister Ahmed Davutoğlu
102 6.64
5 Debates on axis shift and identity of Turkish FP 82 5.34
6 Iran and Turkey–Iran relations (Iran’s Presidential
Elections and political violence during the elections,
Iran–Syria and Iran–Lebanon relations, Iran’s
Nuclear Program, Turkey’s “no” vote in the SC of
UN)
81 5.27
7 Armenia (Armenian Opening, the so-called Genocide
Debate)
80 5.21
8 Turkey–EU relations and EU candidacy process 69 4.49
9 The Russian–Georgian War 52 3.38
10 Conceptual and theoretical discussions on international
relations and Turkish FP (IR theory, the concept of
power, results-oriented process-oriented
understanding of the idealist-realist understanding of
constructive conflict, sub-headings, such as strategic
depth in case)
47 3.06
11 Cyprus (Turkey–Cyprus relations, the EU candidacy
process and Cyprus)
37 2.41
12 Wikileaks documents 30 1.95
13 Turkey–Iraq and Turkey–Northern Iraq relations 26 1.69
14 Energy (oil–gas pipelines, energy security, energy-
political)
25 1.62
15 “New Ottomanism” and “Ottoman Commonwealth of
Nations’ debate”
24 1.56
16 Iran–US relations 21 1.36
17 Crisis in Darfur, Sudan, Omar al-Bashir 20 1.30
18 Missile shield project and the NATO summit in Lisbon 20 1.30
19 Syria 17 1.10
(Continued )


































20 Russia’s FP, Turkey–Russia relations 15 0.97
21 Republican Peoples Party (RPP) FP 14 0.91
22 Greece (Greek economic crisis, Cyprus) 14 0.91
23 Afghanistan 12 0.78
24 Turkey and Hamas 12 0.78
25 Turkey–France relations 10 0.65
26 Global economic crisis 9 0.58
27 China 4 0.26
28 Other (Turkey–India relations-4, Turkey–Azerbaijan-4,









Hürriyet: 1 Taraf: 16 Star: 9 Yeniçağ: 2 221 35.1
Zaman: 96
Radikal: 20 Milliyet: 9 Sabah: 13 Yeni Safak: 53
Optimist
2 Hürriyet: 7 Taraf: 12 Star: 1 Yeniçağ: 1 Zaman: 13 Radikal:




3 Hürriyet: 2 Taraf:2 radikal : 2 Milliyet: 2 Sabah: 2 15 2.3
Cautiously pessimist
4 Hürriyet: 11 Taraf: 1 Zaman: 4 Yeni Safak: 3 19 3.0
Pessimist
5 Hürriyet: 35 Taraf: 7 Zaman: 22 101 16.0
Radikal: 22 Milliyet: 97 Sabah: 4
6 Strongly pessimistic


































102 articles from the “strongly pessimist” category (44 percent of the total articles in
Hürriyet) belongs to Hürriyet.
According to Hürriyet; Turkey, “surrounded by Caucasus Middle East and
Balkans, sits in a rough neighborhood.”45 Nonetheless, Turkish FP in the new era,
“pursues populist policies for the average man on streets,”46 is “ill-advised, provoca-
tive,”47 “uses Islamic references,”48 “facilitates FP issues as instruments for domestic
politics,”49 is “US fan to the extent of Obamania,”50 “ineffectively focuses on futile
Figure 2. The Theoretical Stances of the Newspapers.
Table 5. The Categories of Articles on Their Theoretical Emphasis
Newspapers Realist articles Liberal articles Constructivist articles Total
Hürriyet 68 8 – 76
Cumhuriyet 19 2 – 21
Yeniçağ 17 – – 17
Milliyet 36 7 4 47
Radikal 29 22 26 77
Star 7 6 8 21
Sabah 4 13 9 26
Taraf 2 15 7 24
Yeni Safak 3 17 8 28
Zaman 4 26 19 59
Total 189 116 81 386
48.9% 30% 20.9% 100%






























processes rather than outcomes,”51 “is moving away from the EU and NATO, two
traditional instruments anchored Turkey to the West,”52 “focuses on interpersonal
relations rather than institutionalized foreign policy making,”53 “follows an imperial
vision rather than national interests,”54 “has shifted to the Islamist ideological ground
and embracing global jihad,”55 “has lost traditional western direction,”56 which
“moves back and forth between fantasy and reality,”57 has been disseminating
“We are enough for us” message to the Arabs,”58 is “reckless and irresponsible,”59
“plays the role of U.S. regional subcontractor and neo-Ottoman-looking.”60 More-
over, Hürriyet, which contends that the new setting in Turkish FP has kept it in an
“aimless” and “distant” manner,61 “proposes that Turkey’s tutelage of Omar al-
Bashir of Sudan.”62 Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Iran,63 “the mediator role”
of Turkey between the USA and the Taliban64 has changed “the perception of the
West regarding Turkey.”65 This provocative stance in world politics even if there
is no gain for Turkey, has raised some questions such as “Are we still in the
western camp?” in the mind of Turkish public.66
In Hürriyet, only 13 articles (five percent) in 231 are pro-government and have
optimistic themes. A great majority if these negative cases are about President Abdul-
lah Gül’s visits to Armenia67 Gül’s Latin America visit,68 Turkey’s No vote in the UN
Security Council on the sanctions against Iran,69 Turkey’s Northern Iraq opening70
and Turkey’s growing influence in the Wider Middle East region.71
Also phrases such as “Kasımpaşa bully,”72 “populist FP,”73 “Hamas’s speaker,”74
“Sultan Erdoğan,”75 “Erdoğan is Europe’s Hugo Chavez,”76 “Islam’s Mujahedeen
Davutoğlu,”77 “Mujahedeen James Bond Davutoğlu,”78 “Davutoğlu’s ideological
schizophrenia,”79 “U.S.’s Neo-Ottoman looking sub-contractor,”80 “government’s
global Jihadist ideology,”81 “Jihadist mentality in Turkish FP,”82 are persuasive indi-
cators that show the extreme anti-government attitude of Hürriyet.
In conclusion; it is likely that Hürriyet’s negative attitude toward government’s
performance in FP is the primary driver of its publication policy in the period of
June 2008–June 2011. When reviewing Hürriyet articles, the realist themes look
like a theoretical background to persuasively disseminate this negative stance,
which suggests that, in the strong association of negative attitude toward govern-
ment’s FP making and realist stance, negative attitude precedes the theoretical
stance. The attacks in Hürriyet’s articles to the personalities of AKP’s political
leaders such as Prime Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu
support this assumption as well.
Cumhuriyet
Realist themes triumph in the 103 articles examined in Cumhuriyet. In this regard,
after Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet is the second most realist newspaper. One should also
note that the number of Strongly Pessimist articles in this newspaper is 42 (40
percent). According to Cumhuriyet, “Turkish FP has erroneously and treacherously
slipped from the interest-centric approach to the ideal-centric approach in the new































by the US.”84 Many Turkish economic enterprises have been sold to foreigners with
an “econo-Islamist” understanding85 and Turkey has eventually been drawn to the
“the Middle East quagmire.”86 Turkey, “which has changed her ideological stance
by befriending to Hamas, Sudan and Iran,”87 “has ended her enthusiasm in the EU
membership process.”88 Put simply, Turkish FP has been “intoxicated” by the new
Ottoman “fantasies,”89 and strategic depth “drunkenness” on the brink of the Arab
Spring.90
Among the 103, it is interesting to see only one pro-government article that empha-
sized “some of the policies of Davutoğlu are true since the US has been a withdraw-
ing power.”91 The phrases such as “Davutoğlu’s new Ottoman fantasies,”92 “strategic
confusion in the FP”93 are commonly used, which demonstrate the extreme anti-
government attitude of this newspaper. Like the ones in Hürriyet, therefore, the nega-
tive attitude on government’s performance prevail the theoretical stance in the articles
in Cumhuriyet. The attacks in Cumhuriyet’s articles on the personalities of AKP’s
political leaders support this assumption, a point that one can witness in the Hürriyet
case as well.
Yeniçağ
Among the 50 articles examined in Yeniçağ, 36 were anti-government and 17 were
with realist orientation. Yeniçağ claims that the Ottoman millet system, a dream in
terms of the objective-means balance.94 “The Armenian opening, forced by the
US,”95 “at the expense of alienating Azerbaijan,”96 was a “gamble.”97 In this new
era, Turkey, which has been drafting in “treacherous waters,” could not “get any sig-
nificant result,”98 on many vital issues such as the “question of Cyprus.” The
“romance” currently noticed in the FP of Turkey, “which is currently navigating in
foggy seas,”99 will eventually lead to heavy consequences that will be paid by the
Turkish nation.100
There is only one optimistic article as the negative case in Yeniçağ; this article
states “Turkey has tailored a wise foreign policy that balance the US and
Russia.”101 In this sense, it is likely to assert that the negative attitude toward govern-
ment’s performance is obvious in the case of Yeniçağ.
Milliyet
In the light of 260 articles examined in Milliyet, one may contend that Milliyet has
substantial realist themes, yet they are fewer than the ones in Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet
and Yeniçağ. Although they are fewer than realist articles, Milliyet has some liberal
themes as well. On the other hand, 26 pro-government articles in Milliyet, most of
which were liberal orientations, are worth mentioning. For this reason, this newspaper
could be placed between Pessimist and Cautiously Pessimist categories.
According to Milliyet, the Turkish FP makers have been tailoring its policies not by
“rationality” but by “emotions.”102 Yet Turkish FP is excessively courageous against
Israel, a good example of which is the “One Minute” outburst in the Davos






























Summit;103 “its reluctance to show same courage on Darfur,”104 or Hamas 105 or Iran
tempts one to explain this contradiction as “the mujahideen solidarity.”106 In this new
era, which reflects “imperial aspirations,”107 one notices not only “declining interest
in the EU candidateship”108 but also shifting the axis of traditional FP.109 In the same
vein, the “Islamic identity” of Turkish FP has become very visible,110 and “generates
its political energy from Turkey–Israel conflict.”111 This new approach that disrupts
the principles of traditional FP112 has “fallaciously” failed to recognize that there are
no “eternal friendships” in international relations, and “interests of the states are the
sole determinants of world politics.”113
In the pessimistic camp, unlike Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Yeniçağ, in which nega-
tive attitude toward government’s performance is likely to lead the realist positioning
of the articles, Milliyet’s articles seem less likely to directly attack the government. In
this sense, it would be convenient to position Milliyet in the Cautiously Pessimist
camp. When the thematic structures of the articles are reviewed, the theoretical
stance in Milliyet seems to lead the columnists’ attitudes on government’s perform-
ance. The writing style of the majority of the columnists in Milliyet, that first portrays
a theoretical truth and then efforts to criticize government’s performance with cau-
tiously selected and theoretically convenient words, is also worth mentioning as a
supportive indicator that underlines Milliyet’s grasp of theoretical supremacy rather
than the negative attitude toward government’s performance.
Radikal
The first notable finding on Radikal is that the numbers of articles that include realist,
liberal and constructivist themes, are almost equal among the 247 articles examined.
Radikal, which is usually preferred by more intellectual readers who seek a more
critical and investigatory approach, is, therefore, the most neutral newspaper
among the 10 examined in this study in terms of both its theoretical stance. Similarly,
while 32 articles are optimistic ones, 31 articles negatively address the Turkish FP,
which means that Radikal is also the most neutral newspaper among those examined
in terms of attitude toward government’s performance.
According to Radikal; Turkey has been transforming the wider Middle East region
as “Obama’s peaceful regional vanguard.”114 “The regional weight and thus asser-
tiveness of Turkey has drastically increased.”115 “The new interpretation of her
Ottoman root and multi-dimensional characteristics originated from her soft
power” has provided Turkey a new setting to play a more “positive role” in the
region.116 Furthermore, while “business-oriented and principled mindset of the
Turkish FP”117 enables modern references in FP making, “recalling the imperial
past has made Turkey more assertive.”118 The pillars of this assertive role are: “the
utilization of rhetoric ‘Islamic world should be self-sufficient’ to reconstruct self-
confidence of the Islamic world,”119 the utilization of soft power to facilitate
process-oriented approach to produce “credibility” and “reliability” in the FP,120 util-
ization of Israel as the “ceaseless regional rival,”121 and finally utilization of Turkey’s































notice that it is a great fallacy and nonsense to argue that the axis of traditional
Turkish FP has shifted while the very fundamentals of political system of the
world has been changing.”123 To gain a respected place in the new world order,
Turkey should, first, emphasize “moral obligations rather than national interests.”124
If Turkey realizes these dynamics, she may “live the golden era.” Turkey is actually a
waking “giant.”125
It is evident that the theoretical stance is more important than the attitude on gov-
ernment’s performance in Radikal’s publication policy in this period and thus articles
are shaped accordingly. Radikal’s equal distribution of articles in terms of their theor-
etical stance, not attitude toward government, seems to support this argument.
Star
111 articles examined in Star had mostly liberal and some constructivists themes.
According to Star, the “Turkish sun” has emerged in the Middle East126 and
Turkey, which has started to play “mediating and facilitating role in solving pro-
blems,” has become increasingly visible in the region.127 Erdoğan’s Davos outburst
shows that Turkey, which has “unchained herself from her groundless fears such as
Arab-phobia,”128 has become the country that oppressed “ones look for justice.”129
Turkey also reads changing regional and global dynamics well, “craftily and steadily
makes Israel irrelevant”130 and “broadens her field of maneuver to be able fill the
power gap caused by the economic and political withdrawal of the US from the
wider Middle East.”131 Particularly, “economy-oriented policies of Turkish FP in
the new era has shattered our traditional perception of geography”132 and caused
the emergence of a “Turkish Spring” in the region.133 Star, on the other hand,
“emphasizes that the Turkey–EU relations has increasingly been weakening”134
and Turkish FP has been sailing dangerous in waters with the “New Ottomanism
comedy.”135
The pro-government stance of Star is evident in the articles and thus optimistic
themes outweigh the theoretical background.
Sabah
Two hundred and two articles examined in Sabah are generally in the Optimistic
category and possess liberal and econo-centric themes. Furthermore, Sabah’s
special effort to explain Obama-led US FP is evident. In total, 42 articles in
Sabah specifically focus on Obama’s FP, a focus that makes Sabah the leader in
covering US FP among the newspapers examined. According to Sabah, Turkish
FP in the new period,136 with the support of Turkey’s “raising economic
profile,”137 endeavors to “open up new markets”138 Sabah also emphasizes that,
parallel to increased self-confidence of Turkey, “her ambition towards the EU
membership has waned”139 since Turkey, with both Western and Islamic identity,
has the advantage of being a “hybrid country”140 and seeks to play a “more asser-
tive role in the region.”141






























For Sabah, the Obama administration sees Turkey as a “model partner since
Turkey’s Muslim identity is crucial for US interests.”142 The fact that the “US and
Turkey have identical interests”143 “opens Turkey’s opportunity venues in the
region.”144 “The US, in fact, aims to transform Israel by means of Turkey”145 and
legitimizes “Turkey’s regional leadership.”146 “However, the most important
obstacle between the US and Turkey is Iran.”147 Moreover, the strained Turkey–
Israel relations that has come to the “point of breaking apart after the Mavi
Marmara raid is another dilemma for the US to address.”148
Although Sabah strongly emphasizes liberal themes, the pro-government stance of
this newspaper triumphs over its liberal theoretical background. Therefore, positive
attitude toward government’s performance seems to lead the theoretical positioning
of the articles. The fact that there is only one negative article (pessimist) among
202, which argues that the government has some limitations when tailoring the
Turkish FP149 supports the prominence of Sabah’s pro-government attitude.
Taraf
Twenty-eight of seventy-eight articles (35 percent) examined in Taraf address US FP
or US domestic politics and thus are not directly related to the Turkish FP. According
to Taraf, Obama’s presidency has created a revolutionary impact in the world; and
with Obama’s victory, the politics of fear that ruled the world is over.150 For the
Obama administration, the question of “Who is Turkey?” has become more important
than the question of “Where is Turkey?”151 “Traditional elite in Turkey, representing
the status quo, dislikes Obama since he represents hope and change.”152 US–Turkey
relations, however, especially on the issues of Israel, Iran and the PKK, have some
“thorny” points.153
Taraf also pays attentions to “the EU candidacy and asserts that EU process should
not be seen as a matter of FP and should immediately be internationalized”154 so that
the pace of the adoption of the EU reforms would be faster.155 It is evident that
Taraf’s liberal stance triumphs over its attitude toward government’s performance.
Among newspapers in the liberal and constructivist camp, Taraf is the harshest
when criticizing the government. “The withdrawal of the government from Ermenian
opening,”156 AKP’s not criticizing Iranian government during the Iranian presidential
elections,157 “AKP’s Islamist agenda that separate people as Muslims and non-
Muslims when approaching any FP issue,”158 Turkey’s close stance to Iran,
Hamas and Omar el-Bashir159 and JDP’s pro-Asad and pro-Kaddafi stance at the
onset of crises in Syria and Libya160 are, for instance, severely criticized. It is,
thus, highly likely to assert that the theoretical stance of Taraf leads to its attitude
toward government’s performance.
Yeni Şafak
With 53 articles among 106, Yeni Safak contributes to the Strongly Optimistic cat-































out of 106 (24 percent) are about Israel and all severely criticize Israel, which makes
this newspaper the one with the sharpest criticism toward Israel among 10 newspa-
pers. According to Yeni Safak: in the new era, “Turkey has different FP priorities.”161
Turkey is “shaking off the burdens in its history luggage and reconstructing its iden-
tity”162 “has become a primary player in the region,”163 “with a motivation of respon-
sibility towards its history.”164 Turkey recalls that she has “cultural and emotional
area of influence beyond her borders”165 and eventually has reverted back as a
“leading country” of the Middle East,166 become a “play maker” in the region167
and even become a global power.168 Turkey, by searching for new markets in the
Mesopotamia economic basin and “Caucasus economic basin”169 by undertaking a
role in global conflicts, taking part in International organizations, by proactive recon-
ciliation diplomacy and “zero problem” policy with neighbors170 offers “exciting,
self-reliant and vigorous FP vision, and promises prosperity, stability and peace.”171
On the other hand, according to Yeni Şafak; Turkey criticizes Israel because of the
Gaza assault172 has gained status due to her attitude at Davos;173 “Israel has been
trapped by the US–Turkey–Iran trio,”174 and “has isolated itself”175by virtue of
Obama’s restraining policies,176 therefore the rules of the game in Turkey–Israel
relationships have drastically changed.177 The Mavi Marmara Assault which is the
“9/11 of Turkey,”178 has become a turning point in Turkey–Israel relations,179
Turkey holds a de jure position in this case180 and should immediately break off
with Israel181 a “rogue state” that has lost her reason and morality.182
It is evident that the pro-government stance prevails over its theoretical stance in
Yeni Şafak. The fact that there is only one negative article (Pessimist) among 106
that criticizes the Armenian opening183 supports this argument. Furthermore, the
theoretical shifts of columnists are visible in Yeni Şafak. That is, some columnists,
who have a strongly realist stance on the Turkey–Israel relationship, write strongly
liberal pieces when it comes to Turkey’s role in Wider Middle East. These theoretical
contradictions are also good indicators of the prominence of the pro-government atti-
tude over the theoretical stance in the Yeni Şafak case.
Zaman
Zaman is the main contributor both to the Strongly Optimistic category and the con-
structivist camp. While 96 articles among 106 are strongly optimistic, 32 articles
among 106 are in the constructivist camp. In this context, Zaman is the most construc-
tivist among the 10 newspapers analyzed. For instance, Zaman has 12 articles that
scrutinize the phenomenon of power in world politics. According to Zaman, the chan-
ging balance in the international system “has made the traditional realist-centered
power definition, that is materially defined military and economic power, alter.”184
Zaman, emphasizing “the rise of soft power”185 and explaining this phenomenon
as a consequence of Obama’s new strategy in the evolving the world186 asserts
that the time has come for “questioning the traditional power definitions in
Turkey.”187 Soccer play would be used to melt the frozen conflicts between
Turkey and Armenia as a means of “soft power”188 and “Turkish TV serials that






























have been exported into the Middle East”189 are two good examples of Turkish soft
power.
Besides, according to the Zaman, examining the phenomenon of fear in Turkish
FP, the fundamental characteristics of the new world system are versatility and diver-
sity.190 Claiming that a static axis has already vanished in world politics, for Zaman,
the time has come to face “the ungrounded fears of geographical determinism”191 and
“Turkey should immediately need to liberate herself from her pointless anxieties.”192
The dilemma that Turkey currently faces, for Zaman, is mainly based on fear of
breaking apart the traditionally set but nonetheless “meaningless boundaries.”193
According to Zaman, Turkey has evolved from “a wing country of Cold War years
to a central country in the post-Cold War era”194 and turned from “object into
subject.”195 Zaman claims that this changing role is not the choice for Turkey, it is
in fact an “obligation to play.”196 By redesigning FP, Turkey; has “appeared on
the scene” again after waiting its turn for a long time197 and has “started to play a
mediator role between Islamic and Western world”198 which might eventually lead
to a “Pax Ottomana”199 based on economic dependency in the region.200 On the
other hand, “while Turkey’s vision expands, Turkish politics and press has not yet
been ready to this wider scope.”201
Moreover, both EU and Turkey are responsible for declaration of the EU candidacy
process.202 Still, it may be useful to open the ports in Cyprus and withdraw soldiers
partially as a gesture if EU candidacy is a main FP concern for Turkey203 which “has
already got bored with EU candidacy.”204
Although there are five negative articles (Pessimist) that criticize government’s
relationship with Omar el-Bashir,205 Kaddafi206 and Turkey’s diminishing appetite
for the EU membership,207 most articles have pro-government stance in Zaman.
Zaman’s not taking a Hawkish stance when it comes to the Turkey–Israel relations,
as Yeni Safak does, also deserves notice. In Zaman, the positive attitude on govern-
ment’s performance, therefore, seems to be the main driver of thematic structures
rather than the theoretical stance driving attitude.
Conclusion
This analysis clearly shows that, among opinion leaders in Turkey, there continues a
harsh debate about Turkish FP in the new era. This analysis also illustrates that
Turkish FP has been in a paradigmatic transformation, defined by some as a grand
failure and by others as a grand success. In terms of theoretical stance, however,
the trend of this transformation would be described as a declining influence of tra-
ditionally set realist orientations in Turkish FP and the rise of liberal and constructi-
vist ideas about the FP making process. Results also indicate that opinion leaders in
the Turkish print media, who seem to be stuck in a “overstate/understate spiral” when
assessing the AKP-run government’s performance, have not been fully ready for
theoretical reconstruction of Turkish FP. Relying on the analysis in this study, it
appears that while some among 1535 articles take a negative or positive stance to































columnists, the pragmatic pro/anti government attitude prevails and thus primarily
shapes the thematic structures in a great majority of the articles.
Turkish FP in the new era, according to a hawkish realist and anti-government
camp that includes Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Yeniçağ and Milliyet newspapers, is: ima-
ginative and adventurous, situated amongst fact and fiction, sheared off and axis
shifted, incautious, moving by senses not by reason, over individualized, careless
of EU process, facing ideological shifts, populist, over integrated on internal politics,
raising to the bait fast, has surrendered to the US track, romantic, imperial, pro-Iran,
pro-Omer al-Bashir and pro-Hamas, not idealist on an universal perspective, new
Ottomanist, having a lot of words to say but being futile, show oriented, causing
crisis by spontaneous and sharp scolding performance. On the other hand, According
to a dovish liberal/constructivist pro-government camp that comprises Star, Sabah,
Taraf, Yeni Şafak and Zaman, the Turkish FP is multi-directional, multi-dimensional,
principled, benign, standing with change and transformation, process oriented,
mainly based on soft power, proactive and rhythmic, more independent, having
regional and even global vision, economy oriented, coordinated with the US,
aiming to be a bridge amongst Islam and the West, liberated from past fears, prin-
cipled, the putting forward of moral politics, having historical responsibilities,
getting harmonious with her Islamic identity, going to new markets such as
Africa–China–South America–India, becoming protector of the helpless and a
voice of the oppressed, honorable, standing strong and staid, not needy to the EU,
an awaking giant, a rising sun.
One may, therefore, easily notice from the above-presented analyses of the news-
papers that a great majority of the articles appeared in Zaman, Star, Sabah, Yeni
Şafak and Taraf are the ones that seek to present an optimistic interpretation of
Turkish FP. By contrast, a great majority of the articles that appeared in Hürriyet,
Milliyet, Yeniçağ and Cumhuriyet are the ones that endeavor to spread pessimistic
interpretation of the story. Radikal, however, which equally gave place for articles
that includes realist, liberal, and constructivist themes, is found to be the most
neutral newspaper among 10 newspapers examined.
One notable finding is that only a small number of articles address system-level
changes such as the US–China rivalry, rising of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and
China) countries, effects of the global economic crisis on the international system,
tension between Pakistan–India, Afghanistan, global warming, global security and
terrorism. For instance, only 4 out of 1535 articles touch on China’s rise and sys-
tematic effects of this rising, three articles deal with the Pakistan–India relation-
ship, six articles talk about Afghanistan, and five articles mention events in
Africa. In the light of these numbers, it seems that international issues are severely
underrepresented in the articles analyzed, a disregard that contradicts the regional
and even global vision of the Turkish FP in the new era. It is also interesting to
note that only 69 articles (4.49 percent) among analyzed articles, the eighth
mostly addressed issue in the corpus, are written on the EU and Turkey’s candidacy
process. The fact that the amount of articles related to the EU in the corpus is






























extremely low would be a good indicator of the fading interest of Turkey’s opinion
leaders on the EU in the new era.
In conclusion, conventional wisdom holds that “politics stops at the water’s edge”,
that is, partisan politics concentrates on domestic affairs, whereas FP is (or maybe
ought to be) governed by a domestic consensus on what is in the national interest.
Relying on the analysis of the study, since domestic consensus has not been achieved
in the print media, Turkish FP remains in the eye of the beholder. This study, none-
theless, suggests that Turkish FP in the new era is neither dreadful as hawks portray,
nor marvelous as doves claim. To avoid the overstate/understate spiral, it would be
convenient not to interpret every incident on Turkish FP through the lenses of pro-
versus anti-government positioning. One should note that portraying of every inci-
dent either as an absolute victory or an absolute defeat does not help shape a
healthy public opinion about FP.
All opinions expressed above are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
represent the views of any institution or organization the author has been associated
with.
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9. Cüneyt Ulsever, “Lizbon Zincirini Nasıl Okuyalım?” (Hürriyet, November 25, 2010).
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101. Aslan Bulut, “Gül ve Erdoğan’dan ABD Rusya arasında tahtarevalli politikası” (Yeniçağ, February
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169. F.Koru, “Yeni Türkiye tablosu” (Yenişafak, October 2, 2009).
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193. Ali Aslan, “Erdemli gücün performansı” (Zaman, April 28, 2012).
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